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Daily we make decisions ranging from the mundane to the seemingly pivotal that shape
our lives. Assuming rationality, all relevant information about one’s options should be thor-
oughly examined in order to make the best choice. However, some ﬁndings suggest that
under speciﬁc circumstances thinking too much has disadvantageous effects on decision
quality and that it might be best to let the unconscious do the busy work. In three studies
we test the capacity assumption and the appropriate weighting principle of Unconscious
ThoughtTheory using a classic risky choice paradigmand including a “deliberationwith infor-
mation” condition. Although we replicate an advantage for unconscious thought (UT) over
“deliberation without information,” we ﬁnd that “deliberation with information” equals or
outperforms UT in risky choices.These results speak against the generality of the assump-
tion that UT has a higher capacity for information integration and show that this capacity
assumption does not hold in all domains. Furthermore, we show that “deliberate thought
with information” leads to more differentiated knowledge compared to UT which speaks
against the generality of the appropriate weighting assumption.
Keywords: unconscious thought, judgment and decision making, rational choice, risky choice
INTRODUCTION
In a series of experiments investigating hypothetical automobile
purchases to diagnosing psychological disorders, Dijksterhuis and
colleagues have shown that individuals who are distracted from
conscious deliberation fair as well as, and in many cases better
than, those who consciously explore the options before making a
choice (e.g., de Vries et al., 2010; Dijksterhuis et al., 2010). They
propose that in complex decisions people should not interfere
with automatic information processes and should instead rely on
unconscious processing. The unconscious thought effect (UTE)
is both from a practical and theoretical perspective an interest-
ing phenomenon and has inspired a great deal of research and
controversial debate. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) have sug-
gested theUnconsciousThoughtTheory (UTT) as a generalmodel
that can account for the effect. UTT consists of six rather gen-
eral assumptions (principles) concerning information processing
in judgment and decision making. Two of the core assumptions
are the capacity principle (i.e., unconscious thought (UT) has the
capacity to integrate more information than conscious thought)
and the appropriate weighting principle (i.e., UT assigns more
appropriate weights to attributes or cues than conscious thought).
The generality of these assumptions are tested in this paper and
the principles are explained in greater detail below.
In line with the theory, several experiments show that uncon-
scious information processing can lead to the detection and choice
of superior options (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Bos et al., 2008;
Smith et al., 2008; Ham et al., 2009; Strick et al., 2010; Usher et al.,
2011; for a review and meta-analysis see Strick et al., unpublished)
although other studies were not successful in replicating this effect
(for details see below).Unconscious thought is proposed to be suc-
cessful by avoiding pitfalls of conscious deliberation (Dijksterhuis,
2004) such asmemory retrieval errors (Wilson and Schooler, 1991;
Wilson et al., 1993; Reyna and Brainerd, 1995), processing capac-
ity issues (Miller, 1956), and reliance on (and biases caused by)
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Tordesillas and Chaiken,
1999). Nevertheless, UTT remains partially unspeciﬁc concerning
the boundaries of conscious cognitive capacity, and particularly
the cognitive mechanisms behind unconscious processing are not
clearly speciﬁed.1
The classic UTT experiment consists of 4 choice options with
12 associated attributes which are displayed for a limited period
of time before participants are placed in one of three conditions:
unconscious deliberation, conscious deliberation, or immediate
decision. In the unconscious deliberation condition participants
are distracted from thinking about the options further via sim-
ple tasks before making a decision. In the conscious deliberation
condition participants think about the options without the infor-
mation being available to them before making a selection between
choice options. Finally, those in the immediate decision condition
make their selection directly after viewing the attributes.
1This problem of insufﬁcient process speciﬁcation is thereby not unique to UTT. It
is shared by many dual-process models (see Evans, 2008, for a review). Theorizing
concerning UTT and the latter approaches could highly beneﬁt from more directly
taking into account formal models of memory (e.g., Dougherty et al., 1999; Thomas
et al., 2008) and/or perception (e.g., McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Usher and
McClelland, 2001; Glöckner and Betsch, 2008) that have been applied to judgment
and choice in previous research (see Glöckner and Witteman, 2010, for a critical
discussion).
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People in the unconscious deliberation condition were shown
to make the best selection more frequently than those in the
conscious deliberation and immediate decision conditions (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Strick et al., unpublished; Strick et al.,
2010; Ham et al., 2009; de Vries et al., 2010) lending support for
the UTE. Nevertheless, other studies have also repeatedly failed to
replicate the effect (Calvillo and Penaloza, 2009; Rey et al., 2009;
Thorsteinson and Withrow, 2009; for a critical review see Acker,
2008). Besides the problem that the effect does not always replicate,
several authors have cast doubt on the methodological veracity
of experiments employing the classic UTT paradigm (González-
Vallejo et al., 2008; Waroquier et al., 2009, 2010; González-Vallejo
and Phillips, 2010). Waroquier et al. (2009) argue that in several
studies (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Bos et al., 2008; Strick et al., 2010)
the material was suboptimal in that the attributes chosen to make
one option better than another were poorly constructed. Although
this criticism is valid some recent studies have taken further pre-
cautions to avoid this confound to the greatest extent possible
and still provided replication of the UTE (Usher et al., 2011). This
clearly indicates that theUTE cannot bemerely attributed to issues
of material construction. Payne et al. (2008) attempted to resolve
potential problemswith thematerialmore fundamentally by using
a different kind of tasks, namely by employing decisions between
incentivized gambles. As gambles have a clear best option (i.e.,
the one with the highest expected value (EV) or expected util-
ity (EU)) gamble selection decisions potentially provided a better
test of the UTE by having a clear-cut and (when assuming risk
neutral preferences) person-independent outside criterion for the
goodness of a decision.2 Payne et al. (2008) found in two experi-
ments that participants in the UT condition did not show superior
choice behavior when compared to those in a self paced conscious
thought condition. It should, however, be noted that in response
to the critical ﬁndings by Payne et al. (2008), Dijksterhuis et al.
(2010) argued that the unconscious does not work with numerical
information providing a boundary condition for the UTE. In most
paradigms used in the literature (e.g., the price and size of a ﬂat or
the speed of a car) and also in most real-world decisions numbers
are involved. So that taking this argument seriously would limit
the scope of the theory to very few – if any – situations. So we
prefer to leave it to empirical testing whether parts of the UTE can
also be found for risky choices involving gambles.
While the existence of UTE has been explored in depth there
is a lack of research directly investigating the core principles of
the underlying theory used to explain it. We set out to test two
of the key assumptions in UTT that refer to properties of UT: the
capacity principle and the appropriate weighting principle.
The capacity principle in UTT is stated very generally. “Accord-
ing to the capacity principle, conscious thought is constrained by
its low capacity of consciousness. Unconscious thought does not
have this constraint because the unconscious has a much higher
capacity. It follows that conscious thought by necessity often takes
into account only a subset of the information it should take into
2While the EV provides a clearer standard for the “best” option it does not take into
account individual differences in (myopic) risk aversion (i.e., persons’ willingness
to pay for avoiding risks; Holt and Laury, 2002). We address this possible objection
to our ﬁndings in the third experiment.
account” (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006, p. 96). The authors
also refer to work on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) which
assumes that persons use simple strategies for information inte-
gration. Our interpretation of the principle is that UT is in general
assumed to have higher capacity for information integration than
conscious thought independent of whether information is still
shownorhas to be retrieved frommemory (cf. Bröder and Schiffer,
2003; Glöckner and Hodges, 2011). In sufﬁciently complex tasks,
this should lead to greater performance in UT relative to any con-
dition employing conscious thought. Studies are, however, limited
to comparing UT with conscious deliberation without informa-
tion (Dw/oI, i.e., where the relevant information is not available
for further examination). One might suspect that this speciﬁc sit-
uation is a particular challenge for conscious thought which needs
to have access to the information during deliberation or it risks
errors in memory retrieval (cf. Glöckner and Betsch, 2008; see also
Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). We suspect that a similar argument
holds for the UTE in that its apparent dominance of conscious
deliberation will disappear if all information is provided to those
deliberating consciously. This would indicate that eventual differ-
ences are not the result of capacity or the processing powers of the
unconscious per se but due to information being absent, or dis-
torted, during deliberation. We test the capacity principle of UTT
with the following alternative hypothesis:
H1 – (Capacity Hypothesis): Unconscious thought will lead to
better performance than conscious thought without information but
not when compared to conscious thought with information.
The weighting principle is also stated rather generally in UTT:
“According to the weighting principle, the unconscious naturally
weights the importance of various attributes. Conscious thought
often leads to suboptimal weighting because it disturbs this nat-
ural process” (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006, pp. 95–96). We
interpret this to mean that UT supposedly leads to more accurate
weighting of the choice options.Given thisUTTwouldpredict that
UT will lead to better estimations of each of the choice options
when compared to any condition involving conscious thought.
Another alternative that is equally consistent with the reported
ﬁndings above is that persons might just be better at detecting the
best option during, or shortly after, information uptake and store
a fuzzy representation of it until later retrieval (Reyna and Brain-
erd, 1995) unless such memories are degraded, or their retrieval
made difﬁcult, due to conscious thought without the informa-
tion being available (Wilson and Schooler, 1991). If this were true,
UT would fare reasonably well when selecting the best option
but perform poorly if all options required evaluation. Speciﬁcally,
one would expect that deliberation with information (DI) leads
to a more accurate and differentiated evaluation of the options
as compared to UT and conscious thought without information.
These differential predictions motivate our second hypothesis. We
test against the weighting principle of UTT with the following
hypothesis:
H2 – (Differentiation Hypothesis) Conscious thought with infor-
mation leads to more accurate and differentiated evaluation of the
options as compared to unconscious thought.
Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate whether the stan-
dard UTE is found for gambling decisions comparing an UT
condition and a Dw/oI condition. A new DI condition was added
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to the standard UT paradigm to more directly test the capacity
principle of UTT. Participants were also asked to evaluate the EV
of each of the gambles to test the appropriate weighting principle.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Sixty-three participants (55% female; age-range 16–38) from
Bonn, Germany took part in Experiment 1. The experiment was
run in combination with an unrelated study and participants
were given on average 16C (approximately US$ 22.40) for their
participation.
Procedure and materials
Participants started by reading instructions for the study which
explained that their task would be to evaluate the EV of lotteries
and to choose one lottery to play. They were told that in addition
to a 3C show-up payment they would receive up to 1C per lot-
tery if they correctly indicated the EV of the lottery and that this
amount would decrease proportionally to the distance of their
estimation. They were additionally informed that the lottery they
selected would be incentivized and played out. Their understand-
ing of what an EV is was tested by having them calculate the EV
of a lottery with four outcomes similar to the ones used in the
actual experiment. Only after providing a correct answer were
they allowed to begin the computer-based experiment.
In the experiment participants selected between, and evalu-
ated, 12 lotteries with 4 outcomes/attributes each (see Table 1).
These gambles were randomly generated with the constraint that
the payoffs be between 0 and 25C. We then randomly selected
four gambles with EV’s around 5C, 10.00C, and 15.00C (range:
±1C), to serve as our low, medium, and high EV gambles. Each of
them had a speciﬁc name (i.e., Wynn, Venetian, Excalibur, Luxor,
Rio, Flamingo, Mandalay, Sahara, Mirage, Bellagio, Platinum, and
Ballys) and the assignment of names to lotteries was counter-
balanced between participants. The experiment started with a
presentation of each of the lotteries’ outcomes and its probability
(e.g., Wynn; 17.11C, 35%) one at a time for 5 s in random order
Table 1 | Gambles used in all three experiments ranked from highest
to lowest EV. Each gamble consists of four probabilistic outcomes
(attributes of the gambles).
Rank Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4 EV
1 17.11C, 0.35 15.10C, 0.49 8.60C, 0.12 17.10C, 0.04 15.10C
2 16.15C, 0.32 18.45C, 0.31 14.70C, 0.24 2.60C, 0.13 14.75C
3 1.26C, 0.34 22.30C, 0.28 1.05C, 0.04 22.45C, 0.34 14.35C
4 18.62C, 0.37 18.60C, 0.06 7.90C, 0.21 12.75C, 0.36 14.25C
5 7.06C, 0.22 8.95C, 0.60 14.05C, 0.03 23.40C, 0.15 10.85C
6 6.14C, 0.37 9.50C, 0.27 15.55C, 0.02 15.75C, 0.34 10.50C
7 19.27C, 0.19 10.55C, 0.49 5.10C, 0.03 1.45C, 0.29 9.40C
8 6.10C, 0.13 8.70C, 0.31 3.90C, 0.31 18.00C, 0.25 9.20C
9 1.63C, 0.09 3.55C, 0.15 1.60C, 0.36 10.85C, 0.40 5.60C
10 7.85C, 0.14 8.15C, 0.23 4.00C, 0.40 4.25C, 0.23 5.55C
11 6.04C, 0.31 5.90C, 0.12 3.20C, 0.50 15.35C, 0.07 5.25C
12 4.56C, 0.27 16.50C, 0.13 8.05C, 0.04 2.05C, 0.56 4.85C
(both by alternative and attribute) at the center of the screen. To
allow time for proper encoding of the information each attribute
presentation was separated by a 2-s blank screen presentation.
After all attributes were presented,participants were placed into
one of three treatment conditions, UT (N = 21), Dw/oI (N = 20),
and DI (N = 23). In the UT condition participants completed a
visual working memory task lasting 5 min after presentation of all
lottery information (see Luck and Vogel, 1997 for a description
of the task). In the Dw/oI condition participants were shown a
blank screen with only the names of the 12 lotteries and asked
to spend 5 min thinking about them. In the DI condition partic-
ipants were given the same instructions but were presented with
the outcomes and probabilities of each of the lotteries directly
under their respective names for 5 min. Participants then indi-
cated the EV of each lottery, in random order, on a scale ranging
from 0 to 25C. The ﬁnal task was to select the lottery they wished
to play.
RESULTS
To test the capacity hypothesis and to investigate whether UTE
exists for gambles we tested whether choices were mainly made
for one of the four high EV gambles and whether the highest EV
gamble was chosen.We found that participants were generally able
to select one of the best gambles in 67% of the cases which is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than chance (p< 0.01). In an overall test there
was no difference between the conditions for selection of one of
the four high EV gambles, Fishers exactχ2(2, 63)= 1.31, p = 0.52.
Looking only at the selection of the very best (i.e., the highest EV)
gamble, a logistic regression showed that the UT condition out-
performed the Dw/oI condition, odds = 0.18, z =−1.97, p< 0.05,
which replicates the common UTE. In line with our ﬁrst hypoth-
esis, there was however no signiﬁcant difference between the DI
condition and the UT condition, odds = 0.57, z =−0.85, p = 0.39,
counter to what UTT would predict (see Figure 1). It has, however,
FIGURE 1 | Choices for the gamble with the highest EV in
Experiment 1.
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to be acknowledged that our analysis had only medium power3
and therefore the ﬁnding in favor of the null has to be interpreted
cautiously.
To test the appropriate weighting principle of UTT we ana-
lyzed the difference in EV estimation using the absolute dif-
ference in estimation from the actual EV. Low numbers indi-
cate more accurate estimations. A multi-level random coefﬁcient
model (Nezlek et al., 2006) with repeated judgments at level
1 and participants with random intercepts at level 2 revealed
that the UT condition (M = 5.56, SE= 0.55; high scores indi-
cate bad performance) did not make signiﬁcantly poorer estima-
tions than the Dw/oI condition (M = 4.55, SE= 0.40), b =−1.01,
z(63)=−1.66, p = 0.09, but did make signiﬁcantly poorer esti-
mations than the DI (M = 3.54, SE= 0.26) condition, b =−2.03,
z (63)=−3.44, p< 0.01 (see Figure 2).4,5
To additionally test whether the weighting principle might at
least hold considering ordinal ranks, we calculated Spearman’s
rank order correlations for each subject between persons EV
estimations and the true EV. We compared individual level cor-
relations using t -tests on Fisher Z -transformed scores and found
that persons in the UT condition (ρ= 0.18) did signiﬁcantly worse
in rank ordering the gambles than did participants in theDI condi-
tion (ρ= 0.38), t (42)= 2.17, p = 0.03. We did not ﬁnd the Dw/oI
3WeusedG∗Power (Faul et al., 2007) to determine the power of our analysis. Assum-
ing a medium effect size as reported for the UTE in Acker (2008) and Strick et al.
(unpublished) we ﬁnd that our analysis had a power of 1 – beta = 0.51.
4These results also hold if analyzing estimations of the gamble with the highest EVs
only.
5The greatest estimation errors (i.e., average absolute EV-deviation) were observed
in the four high EV gambles (M = 5.63; SE= 0.37), followed by the four low EV
gambles (M = 4.20; SE= 0.40), and the smallest deviations occurring in the four
medium EV gambles (M = 3.73; SE= 0.30).
FIGURE 2 | Absolute deviations of EV estimations in Experiment 1.
Higher scores indicate larger deviations and therefore less differentiated
knowledge concerning the option. Error bars indicate SEs corrected for
clusters at the participant level.
condition (ρ= 0.19) to differ signiﬁcantly from the UT condition,
p = 0.86. Hence, using two different methods to look at the ability
to estimate and rank the EVs we ﬁnd the data are in line with our
second hypothesis and fail to support the weighting principle as
put forth by UTT.
DISCUSSION
We ﬁnd that the UT condition does better than the Dw/oI condi-
tion but not signiﬁcantly better than the DI condition in selecting
the gamble with the highest EV. Accordingly, in our task thinking
unconsciously is only superior to thinking consciously when par-
ticipants were not provided with information during the thinking
phase. This fails to support the general capacity principle put for-
ward by UTT but supports our alternative hypothesis. It appears
that there is sufﬁcient capacity for conscious deliberation to per-
form as well as its unconscious counterpart opposite to the core
propositions put forth by UTT. As a caveat to this ﬁnding in favor
of the null hypothesis it has, however, to be acknowledged that our
analysis had only medium power (but see also further results in
support of this hypothesis below). Interestingly, we could demon-
strate the UTE with numerical gambles, which was doubted by
Dijksterhuis et al. (2010). Our data show that this response was
premature as we ﬁnd some evidence for the “classic” UTE with
gambles (i.e., comparing the conditions Dw/oI and UT).
As predicted by our differentiation hypothesis, despite doing
well in gamble selection the UT condition was outperformed by
the DI condition in estimating the EVs of each gamble and in rank
ordering the gambles by EV. It seems as though the underlying
mechanisms for these two tasks are different and favor uncon-
scious processing only when the task structure and particularly the
analyzed dependent variable is similar to what is commonly used
inUT experiments: selecting the best choicewithoutmore detailed
and differentiated judgments of all options being required.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the results of Experiment 1 with
an improveddesign that used conditions forwhich theUTE should
be more likely to be found. Particularly, following Acker (2008) we
used a word search task as the distracter task in the UT condi-
tion, shorter presentation intervals, and we reduced the time for
un/conscious thought.
METHOD
Participants
Eighty participants (53% female; age-range 17–66) from Bonn,
Germany, took part in Experiment 2. The experiment was run in
combination with an unrelated study and participants received on
average 16C for their participation.
Procedure and materials
Experiment 2 used the same lotteries and outcomes as Experiment
1 and followed the same basic pattern except for a few changes.
Each outcome was presented for 2 s and the spacing between
outcome presentations was shortened to 500 ms. The distraction
task for the UT (N = 27) condition was replaced with a word
search task and each treatment condition, DI (N = 26) and Dw/oI
(N = 27), was shortened to 4 min.
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RESULTS
As in Experiment 1, no difference was found between the UT,
Dw/oI, and DI conditions for selection of one of the four high EV
gambles, Fishers exact χ2(2, 80)= 2.33, p = 0.34. Looking only at
the selection of the best gamble we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference
between the UT, Dw/oI and, DI conditions, Fishers exact χ2(2,
80)= 7.65,p = 0.02.A logistic regression revealed that theUTcon-
dition performed signiﬁcantly better than the Dw/oI condition,
odds = 0.16, z =−2.18, p = 0.03, but not signiﬁcantly better than
the DI condition, odds = 1.25, z = 0.39, p = 0.69 (see Figure 3),
thus replicating the standard UTE but also providing evidence
against the generality of the capacity principle of UTT.
We analyzed the difference in EV estimation using the absolute
difference in estimations from the EV as in Experiment 1. A multi-
level random coefﬁcient model with repeated judgments at level
1 and participants with random intercepts at level 2 revealed
that the UT condition (M = 5.36, SE= 0.28) tended to perform
worse than the DI condition (M = 4.64, SE= 0.41) but this dif-
ference did not reach conventional signiﬁcance levels, b =−0.71,
z(79)=−1.47, p = 0.07, one-sided6. Nor, did the UT and Dw/oI
(M = 5.56, SE= 0.31) conditions differ signiﬁcantly, p = 0.67 (see
Figure 4).
As in Experiment 1 we performed Spearman rank order corre-
lations between the subjective EV estimation and the true EV. We
again found a tendency that DI shows the highest correlation but
the differences were rather small and did not reach conventional
signiﬁcance levels (UT: ρ= 0.15, DI: ρ= 0.18, Dw/oI: ρ= 0.08; all
t ’s< 1.10, all p’s> 0.15).
6Here and in the following analyses we used one-sided tests in cases in which we had
derived a priori hypotheses based on ﬁndings from other studies reported in this
paper that had been conducted before. Using one-sided tests is advisable under such
conditions to avoid artiﬁcially increasing the beta error and decreasing the power of
the analysis. All these instances are clearly marked in the text.
FIGURE 3 | Choices for the gamble with the highest EV in
Experiment 2.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 replicates the results of Experiment 1 with UT per-
forming as well as DI in making a good, or the best choice. The
UT condition again outperforms the Dw/oI condition in choos-
ing the best option. This provides a replication of the UTE found
in Experiment 1 but at the same time speaks against the capac-
ity assumption of UTT. Additionally, we again ﬁnd that conscious
deliberation with full information tends to produce closer estima-
tions to the EV. It should, however, be noted that the effect was not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels for the interval scaled measure
and even smaller for the rank-correlations (with arguably lower
power). This fails to support the appropriate weighting assump-
tion laid out in UTT but again tends to support our alternative
differentiation hypothesis. However, it is worth noting that the
slight changes made to the experimental paradigm seem to have
resulted in a smaller difference between the UT, Dw/oI, and DI
conditions in EV estimations.
EXPERIMENT 3
Although the results from Experiments 1 and 2 fail to support
the capacity principle and the appropriate weighting principle
put forth by UTT, it might still be asked whether the results also
hold if people are not rewarded by playing the lottery they choose
but instead if they are rewarded directly for choosing the lottery
with the highest EV. This is important because as the criterion for
best choices used in the previous experiments could still have suf-
fered from differences in persons’ risk preferences. This is the case
because risk aversion can lead to preferring options with lower
EV but also lower risk over options with higher EV but higher risk
(Holt and Laury, 2002). Experiment 3 was designed to address this
potential problem. We incentivized participants for selecting the
gamble with the highest EV which fully removes any inﬂuences
FIGURE 4 | Absolute deviations of EV estimations in Experiment 2.
Higher scores indicate larger deviations and therefore less differentiated
knowledge concerning the option. Error bars indicate SEs corrected for
clusters at the participant level.
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of risk preferences when selecting a gamble that might still have
inﬂuenced results in Experiments 1 and 2. We also add a fourth
immediate decision condition (I) to test whether the unconscious
aspect of the UTE indeed has an inﬂuence on choice, or whether
it can be equated to making a choice without deliberation.
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-four (61% female; age-range 17−58) participants from
Bonn, Germany, took part in Experiment 3. The experiment was
run in combination with an unrelated study and participants
earned on average 12C.
Procedure and materials
Experiment 3 used the same materials, procedure, and conditions
as Experiment 2 with the slight modiﬁcation that participants
were told they would not play out the gamble they picked but
instead earn 5C if they selected the gamble with the highest EV.
Additionally, the I condition was added in which participants indi-
cated the gamble with the highest EV and made estimations of the
gambles immediately following exposure to the gambles and their
attributes.
RESULTS
No difference existed between the UT,Dw/oI, I, and DI conditions
for selection of one of the four high EV gambles, Fishers exact
χ2(2, 80)= 2.29, p = 0.51. Looking only at the selection of the
highest EV (i.e., the best) gamble we ﬁnd in an overall test a sig-
niﬁcant difference between the UT, Dw/oI, I, and DI conditions,
Fishers exact χ2(3, 74)= 10.91, p = 0.02. A logistic regression
revealed that the DI condition performed signiﬁcantly better than
the UT and I conditions (odds = 0.19, z =−2.25, p = 0.03 and
odds = 0.09, z =−2.72, p< 0.01 respectively) and marginally bet-
ter than the Dw/oI condition, odds = 0.28, z =−1.81, p = 0.07
(see Figure 5). Hence, with a clear incentive to choose the highest
EV gamble the DI condition even outperformed the UT condi-
tion providing the strongest support for our capacity hypothesis
H1 and against the capacity principle of UTT. No difference was
found between the UT and I conditions, which fails to support
any purported advantage of unconscious processing, odds = 0.47,
z =−0.81, p = 0.42.
We again analyzed the difference in EV estimation using the
absolute difference in estimations from the EV. A multi-level ran-
dom coefﬁcient model with repeated judgments at level 1 and
participants with random intercepts at level 2 revealed that the UT
condition (M = 4.96, SE= 0.26) fared signiﬁcantly worse than the
DI condition (M = 4.25, SE= 0.28), b =−0.71, z (73)=−1.77,
p = 0.04, one-sided. The UT, Dw/oI (M = 5.09, SE= 0.34), and I
(M = 4.89, SE= 0.22), conditions did not differ signiﬁcantly from
each other, all p’s> 0.7. The DI condition also performed bet-
ter than the Dw/oI condition, b = 0.84, z (73)= 2.10, p = 0.02,
one-sided, and tended to be better than the I condition but the
difference did not reach conventional signiﬁcance levels, b = 0.64,
z (73)= 1.58, p = 0.12 (see Figure 6).
We again calculated Spearman rank order correlations between
the participant subjective EV for the gambles and the true EV
and found no differences in accuracy between the UT (ρ= 0.15), I
FIGURE 5 | Choices for the gamble with the highest EV in
Experiment 3.
FIGURE 6 | Absolute deviations of EV estimations in Experiment 3.
Higher scores indicate larger deviations and therefore less differentiated
knowledge concerning the option. Error bars indicate SEs corrected for
clusters at the participant level.
(ρ= 0.23),andDw/oI (ρ= 0.13) conditions,p’s> 0.3. TheDI con-
dition (ρ= 0.28) tended toward better performance in ranking the
EVs than the UT condition but this difference did not approach
conventional signiﬁcance levels, t (36)=−1.34,p = 0.10,one sided.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 replicates the results of the ﬁrst two studies. When it
came to making a good choice, all four conditions did equally well.
However, we do not ﬁnd that the UT condition does better than
any of the other conditions when selecting the best gamble and in
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fact did signiﬁcantly worse when compared to the DI condition.
This provides a third study arguing against the generality of the
capacity principle put forth by UTT. The replication of the ﬁnding
from Experiment 1 that the UT condition does worse than the DI
condition in EV estimations and tends to be worse in rank order-
ing the gambles based on EV provides further evidence that the
appropriate weighting principle put forth by UTT is questionable.
We do not ﬁnd a difference between the UT and I conditions in
EV estimation or choosing the gamble with the highest EV which
is in line with some previous ﬁndings indicating that there is not
always an advantage to unconscious processing over making an
immediate decision (Payne et al., 2008).
It should be noted that although rewarding for selection of the
gamble with the highest EV removes inﬂuences of risk aversion,
it might also induce participants to use a more deliberative form
of information integration than they would naturally do. It has
been shown that the combination of UT and the induction of a
more intuitive decision mode improve performance in judgments
(Usher et al., 2011). We cannot rule out that these speciﬁcs of our
experimental setting might have degraded, or hampered, the per-
formance of the unconscious. Given that, it should be kept inmind
that the results of Experiment 3 might not generalize to settings in
which more intuitive modes of thought are induced.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The three experiments presented in this paper serve as an exten-
sion of previous ﬁndings on the UTE and provide tests of the
generality of two key assumptions behind UTT. We ﬁnd the clas-
sic UTE between the unconscious and Dw/oI conditions when
it came to making the best choice in Experiments 1 and 2. UTE
was present even when the choices and attributes involved purely
numerical information, which speaks against limiting the UTE to
decision tasks not involving numbers (Dijksterhuis et al., 2010).
Our experiments suggest that – when accepting EV as comparison
standard – the unconscious can deal with numerical information
just as well as deliberative thought with full information being
present.
The UT condition outperforms the Dw/oI condition which
is in line with literature showing that conscious thought in the
absence of information often leads to memory retrieval errors and
overwrites (Schooler and Engstler-Schooler, 1990). As we have
explained above, the comparison between unconscious thought
and Dw/oI is, however, not the best test of UTT and its assump-
tion that there is an inherent capacity advantage of unconscious
over conscious deliberation. A more pragmatic comparison, and
one which provides a true test of the capacity principle of UTT,
is between the unconscious thought and the deliberation with
full information condition. In all three experiments we ﬁnd that
unconscious thought is not superior, and in some cases even infe-
rior, to deliberation with full information in making a good, or the
best choice. In fact, if we jointly consider data for Experiments 1
and 2 we ﬁnd that we achieve sufﬁcient power7 to detect such an
7Again, using G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007) to determine the power of our analy-
sis and assuming a medium effect size we ﬁnd that our analysis had a power of
1 – beta= 0.84, although we fail to ﬁnd the UT condition outperforming the DI
condition as predicted by UTT, Fishers exact χ2(1, 97)= 0.08, p = 0.83.
effect if present but fail to do so. These results are directly in line
with our alternative capacity hypothesis stating that unconscious
thought outperforms Dw/oI, but is not better than deliberation
with full information.
With regard to EV estimations and rank ordering of the EVs the
DI condition made smaller errors than the unconscious thought
condition suggesting that while the unconscious may be able to
remember and select a good, or the best choice, the informa-
tion held and manipulated by the unconscious is highly limited
in its detail. It might rely heavily on gist-like representations
(Rivers et al., 2008) and might be hampered by analytic thought
processes (cf. Usher et al., 2011). This ﬁnding provides strong sup-
port for our second hypothesis suggesting that the unconscious
does not generally lend itself to appropriate weighting of infor-
mation in evaluating all options. When evaluating the generality
of our ﬁndings, it has to be kept in mind, however, that we used
in all reported studies choices between gambles. These consist of
abstract outcomes and probabilities and can in principle be solved
in a rule based manner. Both factors are likely to induce a more
deliberate mode of thought and might give some advantage to
the conscious thought condition. It is due to further research to
investigate whether the unconscious outperforms even delibera-
tion with full information concerning choice and/or accuracy of
evaluations in other domains involving less abstract and harder to
grasp information.
CONCLUSION
The comparison between unconscious thought and Dw/oI shows
that unconscious thought leads to better performance in more
cases than conscious deliberation without the information being
available. This is supported both from the studies presented here
but also from other studies (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; de Vries
et al., 2010; Strick et al., 2010).
However, while such ﬁndings are interesting, we feel that such
a comparison does not mirror many typical real-world situations
individuals are placed in daily. In many situations such as impor-
tant purchasing decisions individuals have the ability to reassess
and study information about their options before making a deci-
sion. The comparison between the DI and unconscious thought
conditions provides critical tests of such situations and at the same
time allows testing the generality of basic principles postulated by
UTT. In order for unconscious thought to be touted as the best
strategy for making complex decisions with meaningful outcomes
it must consistently outperform the DI condition. Although it
has to be acknowledged that UT does surprisingly well, we do
not ﬁnd this superiority over DI to be the case in any of the
experiments reported here. Given that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the DI and UT with regards to selecting a good,
or “best,” option only in Experiment 3, but not in Experiments 1
and 2, we have to conclude that DI does not seem to be gener-
ally superior to UT; which is in itself an interesting ﬁnding given
that in DI persons were given all chances to perform well. The
difference in ﬁndings between Experiments 1 and 2 vs. 3 might
be due to the fact that the two former studies could be under-
stood as decisions of personal preference whereas detecting the
highest EV gamble in the last study could be perceived as an infer-
ence task which might increase the probability of using deliberate
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calculations in the DI condition. More generally speaking, it is
quite likely that in situations that involve numerical cues as the
ones used in this study there may be no superiority, and in some
cases that induce calculation as in Experiment 3, an inferiority
of decisions stemming from unconscious thought compared to
those coming from conscious thought with information available.
However, in other situations (e.g., judgments of character, trust-
worthiness, or personality) in which cues are harder to capture
in abstract terms but can be more easily grasped intuitively, or
in cases where all pertinent information may not be available for
review, the UT condition may in fact be found to outperform
conscious DI.
According to Dijksterhuis (2004, p. 597), “[w]hen faced with
complex decisions such as where to work or where to live, do not
think too much consciously. Instead, after a little initial conscious
information acquisition, avoid thinking about it consciously. Take
your time and let the unconscious deal with it.” Although we do
not want to question phenomena such as memory consolidation
by sleeping (e.g., Gais and Born, 2004), we ﬁnd such sugges-
tions to do little initial conscious information acquisition to be
over-generalized and possibly damaging when the decisions men-
tioned have far reaching consequences. Until the UTE is further
explored and its underlying processes (see, e.g., Usher et al., 2011)
and boundary conditions clearly understood we suggest that when
faced with decisions that involve abstract information individuals
will perform their best when they gather all the information they
can about a decision and take the time to study that information
and consciously compare the outcomes before making a choice
based on careful deliberation and emerging intuition (see, e.g.,
Janis and Mann, 1977). Our results indicate that in such decisions
with abstract information doing so does not hurt and sometimes
even increases performance in judgment and choice.
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